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SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF AMERICAN
SOVEREIGNTY

T

HE advocates of a post-war world security organization
are squarely up against the question of "sovereignty."
There has been little audible dissent from proposals for an association of "sovereign" nations to preserve world peace, although -there is wide divergence of opinion concerning the
organization powers and responsibilities of such an association. Those who have specifically criticized the suggestion
have done so for the reason that it does not go far enough to
accomplish its purpose. They contend that the word "sovereign" should be lifted out of all such proposals for -the eason
that its inclusion will neutralize the effectiveness and destroy
the continuity of the proposed association.
To these people an association of "sovereign" nations with
power to enforce its decrees upon its own constituent members is self-contradictory.1 Sovereignty, we are told, means
or implies independence, self-sufficiency and insubordination.
A "sovereign" nation by its very nature takes orders from
nobody but its own constituency. If the new world association is to be effective it must have the right to give orders to
its membership and, if necessary, to enforce them. Such en1 Wendell Willkie, writing in Collier's Magazine, September 16, 1944.
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forcement procedure directed against a "sovereign" nation
would be war, the very thing that the Association is organized to prevent.
Others equally devoted to the idea of effective and permanent world security organization reply to this criticism
substantially as follows:
Granting that the association is to be made up only of
"sovereign" nations, that is precisely as it should be. A state
less than sovereign, i.e., a colony, dependency or protectorate, is obviously not eligible for full and charter membership.
Only "sovereign" nations come to the Association with full
power to act. The very subjection of a nation to -the tenets
and agreements of the Association requires "sovereignty" as
a prerequisite. This prerequisite sovereignty is immediately
qualified, ipso facto, upon entrance into the Association. It is
thus contended that the ability to subject itself to the restraints of such association is one of -the attributes of sovereignty, just as the freedom and competency of a man to marry, and thus subject himself to the subsequent restraints and
obligations of -the marriage state, is a prequisite to a valid
marriage. It should be remembered that when such a marriage has been entered into it is thereafter binding upon botk
parties.
To these two points of view must be added a third which,
properly or not, is held by what is probably a great majority
of those who now think ,that some such form of world association is both desirable and -inevitable. This group believes
that the constituent members of the proposed Association are
now and will continue to be sovereign nations; that as sovereigns, they will and can agree to be bound by the decisions
of -the Association in the area of world security; that as long
as they are members of -the Association -they may be required (forced) to abide by Association decisions. But, as
sovereign nations each may get out of the Association by the
exercise of its own judgment through its own exclusive processes at any future time.
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There is a fourth possibility, namely, the organization not
of a mere association of nations, but of a new world state.
This plan would achieve what none of the advocates of a
mere "association" goes so far as to suggest, namely, an individual personal responsibility of each citizen of all constituent states directly to the new world government. Whereas "association" would at best establish merely a compulsory
co-operation between corporate political bodies (States and
Nations), -the World State would proceed directly against
"aggressive" individualsvery much as our own Federal Government now proceeds against a citizen of Indiana who fails
to pay his Federal Income Tax. Advocates of this new world
government have despaired of the effectiveness of "compulsory" co-operative associations and cite as an example the
hectic history of our own original states before the adoption
of our Federal Constitution.2
All of these proposals involve the question of the "sovereignty" of -the United States. Assuming that we are willing
or even anxious to join a post-war security organization of
nations on any one of the four previously outlined theories,
are we competent to do so? Does the power of United States
Government (sovereign power if you will) enable it to make
a binding commitment to join in the forceful suppression of
aggression all over the world?
"The Fathers of the Constitution did not believe in the
sovereignty of the State in the sense of absolute power, nor
did they believe in the sovereignty of the people in that sense.
The word sovereignty will not be found in the Constitution
or the Declaration of Independence."
In the American conciption of government there is no absolute sovereignty. "The powers of government, especially
those vested in the Federal Government by the Constitution are limited, and beyond those limits the Government
2

Union Now, p. 6 and Union Now With Great Britain, pp. 33 and 125, by

Clarence K. Streit, Harpers.
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may not impose its will upon the individual."3 (italics mine.)
This would seem to be an accurate general statement of
American sovereignty as it relates to the individual citizen.
In this respect the Government of the United States can
neither claim a power nor exercise any jurisdiction over the
individual citizen that is not granted to it by the Federal
Constitution.4 The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution
provides that "the powers not delegated to the United States
by -the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively or to the people."
In its jurisdiction over the individual citizen therefore the
Federal Government operates with a great deal less than
absolute or "sovereign" authority. Even within the restricted
field of its designated operations positive and specific prohibitions against certain procedures, policies and actions are
leveled at all branches of the Federal Government. 5 All representatives of the Government of the United States, whether executive, legislative or judicial, separately or in concert,
would thus seem to be definitely limited in their power to
pledge the adherence of this country to any plan whereby the
individual citizen of -the United States would, directly or indirectly, be subjected to the orders of some body not created
by the Constitution of the United States itself.
If Congress, the President and the Courts are required to
operate within the definitely limited sphere of enumerated
governmental powers,' how may they or any of them create
3 The Constitution of the United States, James M. Beck. George H. Doran
Co. pp. 213-221.
4 Martin v. Hunters Lessee, 1 Wheaton (U. S.) 304; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9
Wheaton, (U. S.) 1; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542.
5 Article 1, Section 9, Amendments I to XI inclusive, United States Constitution.
6 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (U. S.) 137.
"It becomes unnecessary to enlarge upon so plain a proposition as it is removed
beyond all doubt by the tenth article of the Amendments to the Constitution . . .
the ratification of the Constitution by the convention of this state (New York)
was made with the explanation and understanding that 'every power, jurisdiction
and right which was not clearly delegated to the general government remained to
the people of the several states or to their respective state governments'." Kent,
C. J., in Livingston & Fulton v. Van Ingen et al, 9 Johns 507 (1812).
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an agency with powers superior to and more far reaching
than those possessed by its creators? For instance, since no
branch of the Federal Government may take the life, liberty
or property of an American citizen "without due process of
law," I how might Congress, 'the President, or both, empower
a world association so to do?
Aside from the inherent disability of the agent (Federal
Government) to give its sub-agent (the world association)
more power than the agent itself possesses, such an attempt
to do so would probably violate the delegatus non potest
delegare principle.' The Constitution gives to Congress the
power "to declare war . . . (and) to raise and support

armies." ' It is conceivable, however, that the effectiveness
of a World Security Association would require the centralization of such power over all countries exclusively in the
Association. Could Congress thus delegate and, ipso facto,
abdicate its Constitutional power in these respects? 10
It will be urged, however, that the Constitutional limitations set forth in all of the cases heretofore cited are lifted
if the indicated steps are taken through the medium of a
treaty with foreign nations; that treaties made upon the
authority of the United States are valid and binding, constitutional limitations to the contrary notwithstanding. It is
to be observed, however, that the principal case supporting
this contention had to do with a conflict between the provisions of a treaty and state laws dealing with the same subjeot matter. 1 A treaty between the United States and Great
The broad statements that the Federal Government can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the constitution and such implied powers as
are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically
true only in respect of our internal affairs. United States v. Curtis Wright Export
Corporation, 299 U. S. 316.
7
8

United States Constitution, 5th Amendment.
A. L. A. Schecter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, and

cases cited therein.
9 Article 1, Section 8, United States Constitution.
10 Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388; A. L. A. Schecter v.
U. S., 295 U. S. 495.
11 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416.
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Britain (December 8, 1916) was designed to protect and
limit the shooting of certain migratory birds. Congress subsequently passed a law on July 3, 1918, implementing the
treaty with appropriate fines and punishments and providing
for its enforcement by Federal game wardens. The State of
Missouri brought a bill in equity to prevent one of these
wardens from enforcing the provisions of the Congressional
Act. It was the contention of the State of Missouri that the
jurisdiction over game birds was reserved to the States by
the provisions of -the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. In the course of the court's opinion Justice Holmes declared:
"No doubt the great body of private relations usually fall within the
territorial limits of the state, but a treaty may override its power...
We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treatymaking power but they must be ascertained in a different way ... The

treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be
found in the constitution. The only question is whether it is forbidden
by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment.
Missouri v. Holland thus decided simply that acts of Congress enforcing treaty provisions, which in the absence of
the treaty would be unconstitutional as infringing upon powers reserved to the states, are constitutional, and can be reinforced regardless of whether or not the Congressional acts
conflict with state laws or state constitutions. This is far
from concluding that anything may be accomplished through
the medium of the treaty power. Although the decision went
further than many commentators thought proper 2 it merely
settled in the Federal Government a power that would otherwise have rested in the state government. It did not touch
upon the possibility that a treaty might call into being a
power which the constitution, expressly or by implication,
denied to either the state or federal government. Justice
Holmes was careful to point out that the treaty in question
did not "contravene any prohibitory words to be found in
12 Forrest R. Black, "Missouri v. Holland to Absolutism," 25 Ill. Law Rev. 911.

a Judicial Milepost on the Road
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the constitution." This leaves unsettled the question as to
whether or not the restrictions contained in section' 9, of article I or specific prohibitions contained in -the Bill of Rights
(Amendments 1 to 9) could be validly violated by treaty
provisions. It is undoubtedly true, however, that the doctrine
of Missouri v. Holland goes far toward the establishment of
sovereignty in treaties made "under the authority of the
United States" and "makes more important than ever the
political check which resides in the Senate on the treatymaking power."

3.

It is possible, as one writer says, that an effect of this
decision will be the establishment of "a third legislative
branch of the government, composed of the President and
some foreign nation, with the veto power vested in the Senate, which is authorized to enact local police regulations
governing the affairs of our citizens. In this day of internationalism the possibilities inherent in such a system are
not lightly to be disregarded." "'
By this construction a treaty may conceivably bind the
citizen in a matter or manner that, in the absence of -the
treaty, no state or federal law could accomplish. Such a
treaty would be to all intents and purposes, an amendment
to the constitution of the United States. Its serious consequences would thus seem amply to justify the constitutional requirement that treaties be ratified by "two-thirds of the
Senators present." 5 Present proposals to change the method
of their ratification -so as to make the conclusion of treaties
simpler and easier of accomplishment should be carefully
considered for what they are, namely, a drastic relaxation
of the amending procedures outlined in the Constitution itself.18
If the fullest implications of the decision in Missou'i v.
Holland are admitted, then these would seem to exist under
18

Edward S. Corwin in 15 Amer. PoL Science Rev. p. 54.
14 L. L. Thompson, 11 Calif. Law Rev. 250.
15 Article H, Section 2, United States Constitution.
16 Article V of the United States Constitution.
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"the authority of the United States" exercised through appropriately ratified treaties, the power to put this country
into an association of nations with full power to act. That
power may or may not be "sovereignty" depending upon the
sense in which that term is used. It is definitely settled, however, that an act of Congress passed subsequently to the
treaty could validly and immediately take us out of such an
association. There is, in other words, a complete equality in
the binding character of a law and treaty respectively, and
in case of conflict, the last, in point of time takes legal pre17
cedence.
Thus, other members of the proposed association could
never be certain that a subsequent Congress might not repudiate some or all of the obligations of our membership.
The activities, orders and policies of the association would
certainly be a continuously open political question in the
United States.
It has likewise been decided that wide as the field of treaty
action undoubtedly is, it is subject, -theoretically at least, to
constitutional limitations. The constitutionality of treaties,
like the constitutionality of acts of Congress, is a matter for
judicial determination by the Supreme Court."8 Sooner or
later, the validity of our entrance into any permanent association of World Powers is certain to be questioned in our
courts and while the prospects of an ultimate determination
of unconstitutionality is remote, the consequences of such a
determination would be infinitely more serious than an abrogation of our membership by Congressional legislation. Leg17

Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253. Head Money Cases: 112 U. S. 580, Whitney

v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, Chinese Exclusion Cases: 130 U. S. 581, Sanches v.
United States, 216 U. S. 167.
18 Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S. 1, Chase v. United States, 222 Fed. 593.
19 Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425.
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islation would end our obligations as of the date of the repealing enactment but a judicial determination of unconstitutionality would have the effect of nullifying our membership from its inception.
In deciding -the case of United States v. Curtis Wright
Export Corporation2 0 Justice Sutherland makes an impressive collection of precedents which seem to support the contention that in the field of foreign relations the United States
is completely sovereign and that its activities in this field are
unrestricted by those constitutional limitations, doctrines and
rules of construction that would belabor its functions in purely domestic affairs. He concluded that "as a member of -the
family of nations the right and power of the United States
in that field are equal to the right and power of the other
members of the internationalfamily. (Italics mine.) Otherwise the United States is not completely sovereign."
It is important to note that this case did not involve a
treaty but a mere joint resolution of Congress by which the
President was empowered to prohibit the sale of arms in the
United States to those countries then engaged in armed conflict in -the Chaco.
A strong reliance upon this opinion will undoubtedly be
made by those who contend that the provisions for international post-war security should be made by joint resolution of Congress rather than by means of a treaty. This procedure would by-pass the difficulty of securing the ratification of the treaty by the concurrence of two-thirds of the
Senators present.
The italicized portion of the foregoing quotation is challenging to say the least. Unlike the United States, other
20

United States v. Curtis Wright Export Corporation, 299 U. S. 316.

10
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members of the "international family" are now and will
probably continue to be completely unrestricted in their
powers. Their governments are unrestricted and -their citizens unprotected by bills of right, separation of powers principles or a political philosophy based upon the theory of unalienable individual rights. If through the instrumentality of
a treaty, or an executive agreement made pursunt -toa joint
Congressional resolution or otherwise, the United States
government may suddenly take on the full "sovereign" qualities of other members of the international family then that
result should be frankly and seriously considered in all our
discussions of post war settlements.
Clarence Manion.

